[Server] Inform client of login/registration rate limit timeout (#7468)
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* [Security] Add per-address rate limiting for auth endpoints

Introduce a thread-safe RateLimiter that tracks attempts per key
(IP address) within a sliding time window, and wire it into the
authentication endpoints:

- Login: failed login attempts from an address are counted; once the
  configured maximum is exceeded within the window, further logins
  from that address are rejected with RespTooManyRequests. A
  successful login clears the failed attempts for that address.
- Registration: implement the previously stubbed
  tooManyRegistrationAttempts, limiting how many accounts can be
  created per address per window.
- Forgot-password: throttle both the email-request and the
  email-challenge paths per address.

New [security] settings with defaults:
  max_login_attempts_per_ip=5 / login_attempt_window_seconds=900
  max_registrations_per_ip=2 / registration_window_seconds=3600
  max_forgot_password_requests_per_ip=3 / forgot_password_window_seconds=3600

Adds unit tests for the RateLimiter (window limit, over-limit
blocking, clearing, per-key independence).

Took 3 minutes

* [Server] Fix rate limiter: disable semantics, draining window, bounded keys, pre-work login gate

- recordAttempt()/isBlocked() return false when maxAttempts <= 0 or windowSeconds <= 0, so the documented 'set to 0 to disable' actually disables instead of blocking every address permanently
- Keys at their limit are rejected without recording, so repeated attempts at the attacker's pace cannot keep sliding the window and holding the lockout open; a block now clears once the recorded attempts age out of windowSeconds
- Attempts map is bounded: an opportunistic prune (every 60s) erases keys whose attempts have fully aged out
- Login is throttled before the work: isLoginRateLimited() (a new virtual on Server, backed by isBlocked()) gates loginUser(), so a locked-out address no longer burns a database round trip and password verification per attempt
- recordAttemptAt()/isBlockedAt() time seams make the sliding-window behaviour deterministically testable; tests rewritten for the real semantics (no reliance on the maxAttempts=0 bug, no sleeps)

* [Server] Inform client of login/registration rate limit timeout

- Add retryAfterSeconds/retryAfterSecondsAt to RateLimiter to compute
  seconds until oldest attempt exits the sliding window
- Expose loginRateLimitRemainingSeconds via Server/Servatrice
- Include denied_end_time (absolute epoch) in RespTooManyRequests for
  login pre-auth and when transitioning to lockout after failed attempt
- Include denied_end_time in registration rate limit response
- Client: show retry time for login RespTooManyRequests
- Client: simplify registration RespTooManyRequests message to show
  retry time when provided
- Add test for retryAfterSecondsAt

* [Client] Restore registration guidance and drop duplicated rate limit reason

The registration RespTooManyRequests case now only shows the retry-after
copy when the server actually sent a denied_end_time; the per-email account
cap path (no end time) falls back to the previous guidance about already
having an account and contacting the server operator.

Drop the canned denied_reason_str from the new login rate limit branches so
the client no longer prints the same sentence twice.

* [Server] Exempt trusted_sources from auth rate limits

Addresses in security/trusted_sources bypass per-address limits, matching
the existing max_users_per_address bypass in initSession. Without this,
Webatrice behind local nginx (all clients as 127.0.0.1) would lock out
every web user after 5 mistyped passwords, and cap the whole server at
2 registrations / 3 forgot-password requests per window.

Adds Servatrice::isRateLimitExempt helper; recordFailedLogin,
isLoginRateLimited, recordRegistrationAttempt and
recordForgotPasswordAttempt all check it.

# Conflicts:
#	servatrice/src/servatrice.cpp

* [Server] Key login rate limit by (address, username)

A successful login cleared the whole per-IP failure history, so 4 bad
guesses plus 1 self-login (or guest UnknownUser login) from the same
address bypassed the limiter. Failures are now bucketed per
(address, lowercase username) and a success clears only its own pair.

---------

Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de>
This commit is contained in:
BruebachL 2026-10-16 05:47:43 +02:00 • committed by GitHub
parent 213ce691dd
commit 456d9d9e70
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GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
12 changed files with 600 additions and 9 deletions

View file

@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <QSsl>
#include <QString>
#include <QStringList>
#include <QStringLiteral>
#include <QThread>
#include <QTimer>
#include <QTypeInfo>
@ -1286,6 +1287,105 @@ int Servatrice::getForgotPasswordTokenLife() const
return settingsCache->value("forgotpassword/tokenlife", 60).toInt();
}
/**
* @brief Rate limiter key for one login target.
*
* Keyed by (address, username) so a success only clears that pair's history:
* a guest login or a login as the attacker's own account from the same
* address must not wipe out another user's failure count. Lowercased so
* case variations of the same name share one bucket.
*/
static QString loginLimitKey(const QString &ipAddress, const QString &userName)
{
return QStringLiteral("login:") + ipAddress + QStringLiteral(":") + userName.toLower();
}
bool Servatrice::recordFailedLogin(const QString &ipAddress, const QString &userName)
{
if (isRateLimitExempt(ipAddress)) {
return false;
}
return rateLimiter.recordAttempt(loginLimitKey(ipAddress, userName), getMaxLoginAttemptsPerIp(),
getLoginAttemptWindowSeconds());
}
bool Servatrice::isLoginRateLimited(const QString &ipAddress, const QString &userName)
{
if (isRateLimitExempt(ipAddress)) {
return false;
}
return rateLimiter.isBlocked(loginLimitKey(ipAddress, userName), getMaxLoginAttemptsPerIp(),
getLoginAttemptWindowSeconds());
}
int Servatrice::loginRateLimitRemainingSeconds(const QString &ipAddress, const QString &userName)
{
return rateLimiter.retryAfterSeconds(loginLimitKey(ipAddress, userName), getMaxLoginAttemptsPerIp(),
getLoginAttemptWindowSeconds());
}
bool Servatrice::recordRegistrationAttempt(const QString &ipAddress)
{
if (isRateLimitExempt(ipAddress)) {
return false;
}
return rateLimiter.recordAttempt("register:" + ipAddress, getMaxRegistrationsPerIp(),
getRegistrationWindowSeconds());
}
bool Servatrice::recordForgotPasswordAttempt(const QString &ipAddress)
{
if (isRateLimitExempt(ipAddress)) {
return false;
}
return rateLimiter.recordAttempt("forgot:" + ipAddress, getMaxForgotPasswordRequestsPerIp(),
getForgotPasswordWindowSeconds());
}
bool Servatrice::isRateLimitExempt(const QString &ipAddress) const
{
// Mirrors the max_users_per_address bypass in initSession: trusted sources
// (e.g. 127.0.0.1 for Webatrice behind local nginx, where every websocket
// client shares one address) are not subject to per-address limits.
const QString trustedSources = settingsCache->value("security/trusted_sources", "127.0.0.1,::1").toString();
return trustedSources.contains(ipAddress, Qt::CaseInsensitive);
}
void Servatrice::clearFailedLogins(const QString &ipAddress, const QString &userName)
{
rateLimiter.clearAttempts(loginLimitKey(ipAddress, userName));
}
int Servatrice::getMaxLoginAttemptsPerIp() const
{
return settingsCache->value("security/max_login_attempts_per_ip", 5).toInt();
}
int Servatrice::getLoginAttemptWindowSeconds() const
{
return settingsCache->value("security/login_attempt_window_seconds", 900).toInt();
}
int Servatrice::getMaxRegistrationsPerIp() const
{
return settingsCache->value("security/max_registrations_per_ip", 2).toInt();
}
int Servatrice::getRegistrationWindowSeconds() const
{
return settingsCache->value("security/registration_window_seconds", 3600).toInt();
}
int Servatrice::getMaxForgotPasswordRequestsPerIp() const
{
return settingsCache->value("security/max_forgot_password_requests_per_ip", 3).toInt();
}
int Servatrice::getForgotPasswordWindowSeconds() const
{
return settingsCache->value("security/forgot_password_window_seconds", 3600).toInt();
}
bool Servatrice::getEnableForgotPasswordChallenge() const
{
return settingsCache->value("forgotpassword/enablechallenge", false).toBool();