[Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords

Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

Took 1 minute

Took 10 seconds

Took 7 minutes
This commit is contained in:
Lukas Brübach 2026-08-04 11:36:10 +02:00 committed by GitHub
parent 048fe247f4
commit 709233d977
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33 changed files with 834 additions and 30 deletions

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@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ void FeatureSet::initalizeFeatureList(QMap<QString, bool> &_featureList)
_featureList.insert("idle_client", false);
_featureList.insert("forgot_password", false);
_featureList.insert("websocket", false);
// featureList.insert("hashed_password_login", false);
_featureList.insert("hashed_password_login", false);
_featureList.insert("challenge_response_auth", false);
// These are temp to force users onto a newer client
_featureList.insert("2.7.0_min_version", false);
_featureList.insert("2.8.0_min_version", false);