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BruebachL 2026-09-20 19:36:32 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit 9c7cf26bee
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3 changed files with 37 additions and 5 deletions

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@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ websocket_host=any
; The TCP port number servatrice will listen on for websockets clients; default is 4748
websocket_port=4748
; If websockets are served through a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx), the real client address can be
; read from an HTTP header such as X-Forwarded-For. The header is ONLY trusted when the websocket
; connection itself originates from an address listed in security/trusted_sources (default 127.0.0.1,::1),
; so that clients cannot spoof their address to bypass bans or rate limits.
web_socket_ip_header=
; When database is enabled, servatrice writes the server status in the "update" database table; this
; setting defines every how many milliseconds servatrice will update its status; default is 15000 (15 secs)
statusupdate=15000

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@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
#include <server_protocolhandler.h>
#include <server_room.h>
// Maximum size of a single ISL message.
static const int MAX_ISL_MESSAGE_SIZE = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
inline Q_LOGGING_CATEGORY(IslInterfaceLog, "isl_interface");
void IslInterface::sharedCtor(const QSslCertificate &cert, const QSslKey &privateKey)
@ -243,6 +246,13 @@ void IslInterface::readClient()
(((quint32)(unsigned char)inputBuffer[1]) << 16) +
(((quint32)(unsigned char)inputBuffer[2]) << 8) +
((quint32)(unsigned char)inputBuffer[3]);
// Reject implausible lengths instead of buffering until they arrive.
// This also handles lengths that overflow into negative int values.
if (messageLength < 0 || messageLength > MAX_ISL_MESSAGE_SIZE) {
qCWarning(IslInterfaceLog) << "Invalid message length" << messageLength << "from" << peerAddress;
socket->disconnectFromHost();
return;
}
inputBuffer.remove(0, 4);
messageInProgress = true;
} else {

View file

@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ inline Q_LOGGING_CATEGORY(WebsocketServerSocketInterfaceLog, "websocket_server_s
static const int protocolVersion = 14;
// Maximum size of a single TCP protocol message. Matches the websocket limit.
static const int MAX_TCP_MESSAGE_SIZE = 1500000;
AbstractServerSocketInterface::AbstractServerSocketInterface(Servatrice *_server,
Servatrice_DatabaseInterface *_databaseInterface,
QObject *parent)
@ -3668,13 +3671,21 @@ void TcpServerSocketInterface::readClient()
(((quint32)(unsigned char)inputBuffer[1]) << 16) +
(((quint32)(unsigned char)inputBuffer[2]) << 8) +
((quint32)(unsigned char)inputBuffer[3]);
// Reject implausible lengths instead of buffering until they arrive.
// This also handles lengths that overflow into negative int values.
if (messageLength < 0 || messageLength > MAX_TCP_MESSAGE_SIZE) {
qCWarning(TcpServerSocketInterfaceLog)
<< "Invalid message length" << messageLength << "from" << getAddress();
prepareDestroy();
return;
}
inputBuffer.remove(0, 4);
messageInProgress = true;
} else {
return;
}
}
if (inputBuffer.size() < messageLength || messageLength < 0) {
if (inputBuffer.size() < messageLength) {
return;
}
@ -3780,10 +3791,15 @@ void WebsocketServerSocketInterface::initConnection(void *_socket)
QByteArray websocketIPHeader = settingsCache->value("server/web_socket_ip_header", "").toByteArray();
if (websocketIPHeader.length() > 0 && socket->request().hasRawHeader(websocketIPHeader)) {
QString header(socket->request().rawHeader(websocketIPHeader));
QHostAddress parsed(header);
if (!parsed.isNull()) {
address = parsed;
// Only trust the forwarded header if the connection itself comes from a trusted proxy,
// otherwise a client could spoof its address to bypass bans and rate limits.
QString trustedSources = settingsCache->value("security/trusted_sources", "127.0.0.1,::1").toString();
if (trustedSources.contains(socket->peerAddress().toString(), Qt::CaseInsensitive)) {
QString header(socket->request().rawHeader(websocketIPHeader));
QHostAddress parsed(header);
if (!parsed.isNull()) {
address = parsed;
}
}
}