[Server] Parse the rightmost address from forwarded header lists (#7586)
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X-Forwarded-For carries a comma-separated list, and constructing a
QHostAddress from the raw header value returns a null address for it, so a
configured X-Forwarded-For or a multi-hop header never resolved and websocket
clients stayed on the proxy's address.

- Add parseForwardedAddress, returning the rightmost usable entry of a
  forwarded header list
- Use it for the websocket handshake instead of parsing the raw value
- Exempt loopback from per-address auth rate limits so a same-host proxy with a
  customized trusted_sources list cannot lock every user out
- Add forwarded_address_test

Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de>
This commit is contained in:
Zach H 2026-10-18 16:53:55 -04:00 • committed by GitHub
parent 46cdbac830
commit ea6af0048c
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GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
8 changed files with 100 additions and 7 deletions

View file

@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include "deck_tag_serialization.h"
#include "email_parser.h"
#include "forwarded_address.h"
#include "libcockatrice/protocol/pb/admin_commands.pb.h"
#include "libcockatrice/protocol/pb/developer_commands.pb.h"
#include "libcockatrice/protocol/pb/moderator_commands.pb.h"
@ -4560,8 +4561,7 @@ void WebsocketServerSocketInterface::initConnection(void *_socket)
// Only trust the forwarded header if the connection itself comes from a trusted proxy,
// otherwise a client could spoof its address to bypass bans and rate limits.
if (isTrustedSource(servatrice->getTrustedSources(), socket->peerAddress())) {
QString header(socket->request().rawHeader(websocketIPHeader));
QHostAddress parsed(header);
const QHostAddress parsed = parseForwardedAddress(socket->request().rawHeader(websocketIPHeader));
if (!parsed.isNull()) {
address = parsed;
}