[Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords

Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

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Took 7 minutes

libcockatrice_network/libcockatrice/network/server/remote/server.h

@@ -85,6 +85,11 @@ public:
     {
         return QMap<QString, bool>();
     }
+    /** @brief True when only challenge-response logins are accepted (strict mode). */
+    virtual bool requiresChallengeResponseAuth() const
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
     void addClient(Server_ProtocolHandler *player);
     void removeClient(Server_ProtocolHandler *player);
     QList<QString> getOnlineModeratorList() const;