[Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords

Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

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Took 7 minutes

libcockatrice_protocol/libcockatrice/protocol/pb/response_password_salt.proto

@@ -6,4 +6,14 @@ message Response_PasswordSalt {
         optional Response_PasswordSalt ext = 1017;
     }
     optional string password_salt = 1;
+    // scrypt cost parameters for password_salt. Absent/zero for legacy accounts.
+    optional int32 n = 2;
+    optional int32 r = 3;
+    optional int32 p = 4;
+    // Server-generated challenge. When present the client must authenticate
+    // with a challenge-response instead of transmitting the password hash.
+    optional bytes nonce = 5;
+    // True when the account still uses the legacy password format and should
+    // be migrated to the scrypt format after a successful login.
+    optional bool needs_migration = 6;
 }