Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.
Fix#344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.
Took 3 minutes
Took 1 minute
Took 10 seconds
Password salts and activation tokens were generated with the global SFMT
RNG, which was seeded from a 32-bit timestamp, making registration
salts and activation tokens predictable. The game RNG used the same
timestamp seed across restarts.
Add CryptoUtil backed by OpenSSL RAND_bytes and use it for salt/token
generation and to seed RNG_SFMT with a 64-bit CSPRNG value in both the
client and server. Link libcockatrice_utility against OpenSSL::Crypto.
Took 30 seconds