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* [Installer] Stop calling the payload free while an executable is locked The guard answered "nothing is holding the payload" from two lookups that can both miss a running instance: Restart Manager does not reliably report a program's own image or the modules it mapped, and the image path of a process running under another account cannot be read from the probe at all. A user log showed exactly that: the first guard passed while cockatrice.exe was running from the directory, the old uninstaller silently skipped the file it could not delete, and the update aborted half an uninstall later with "cancelled by user" after a close attempt the running window ignored. Ask the file itself. A running image is opened without write sharing, so the write open replacing it needs is refused with ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION for as long as the program runs, while a file that is merely being read still accepts it. When neither lookup named anybody and a payload executable refuses that open, the probe answers that the file is in use and that the program holding it could not be identified - the guard's "could not confirm" dialog, whose Retry works once the user has closed it - instead of passing the payload as free. Only the payload executables are tested, not every file the purge removes: a locked executable proves a program is running and a mapped DLL belongs to a running executable, while a locked DLL or qt.conf can be the asking process itself, which is the loop the guard already had. The open is retried once after 300 ms, and only for the files that refused, so a scanner holding a file for a moment cannot stop an install for nothing. The Windows probe check now covers that answer: a payload executable held by the asking process, so that it cannot be named, has to come back as in use rather than as free. Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de> * [Installer] Close running clients over a local socket The installer could only ask a running client to close with WM_CLOSE, which an instance hidden in the notification area or sitting on its own confirmation cannot answer usefully. Give every client a per-process local socket and have the holder probe ask it there first, falling back to WM_CLOSE for clients from before the socket. * [Installer] Offer to check again or update by hand when files stay locked Replace the two-answer guard prompt with force close, close by hand and check again, or cancel. Retry the automatic close while the set of holders changes, and point a cancelled run at the latest release so a user who does not want anything killed has a way forward that is not cancelling the update again. --------- Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de>
50 lines
1.7 KiB
C++
50 lines
1.7 KiB
C++
#ifndef COCKATRICE_INSTALLER_CLOSE_SERVER_H
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#define COCKATRICE_INSTALLER_CLOSE_SERVER_H
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#include <QObject>
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#include <QString>
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class QLocalServer;
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/**
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* @brief Listens for the installer's request to close this instance gracefully.
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*
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* The Windows installer cannot reach an instance whose window is hidden in the notification
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* area with WM_CLOSE, and it must not kill a process that may hold an unsaved deck. It
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* connects to this local socket instead and writes one line; the instance then closes the
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* same way its own close button does - saving settings and answering its own confirmation,
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* never bypassing it.
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*
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* The socket name carries the process id, so every instance has its own and an installer
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* that found several can ask each one. It is built by installerCloseSocketName() in
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* tools/installer-holder-probe/installer_close_name.h; the two must stay identical.
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*/
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class InstallerCloseServer : public QObject
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{
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Q_OBJECT
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public:
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explicit InstallerCloseServer(QObject *parent = nullptr);
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/**
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* @brief Starts listening. A failure is not fatal: the installer falls back to
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* WM_CLOSE, which is what older clients answer.
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*/
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bool listen();
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/// The socket name this process listens on. The installer's probe builds the same
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/// string from the process id and the account name.
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static QString socketName(qint64 processId);
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/// The name for an explicit account, exposed so the probe's name helper and this one
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/// can be tested against each other.
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static QString socketNameForUser(qint64 processId, const QString &userName);
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signals:
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void closeRequested();
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private:
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QLocalServer *server = nullptr;
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QString name;
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};
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#endif // COCKATRICE_INSTALLER_CLOSE_SERVER_H
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