Cockatrice/libcockatrice_protocol/libcockatrice/protocol/pb/event_server_identification.proto
Lukas Brübach 7a3067d4a8 [Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords
Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

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Took 7 minutes
2026-09-04 13:49:22 +02:00

17 lines
495 B
Protocol Buffer

syntax = "proto2";
import "session_event.proto";
message Event_ServerIdentification {
extend SessionEvent {
optional Event_ServerIdentification ext = 500;
}
enum ServerOptions {
NoOptions = 0;
SupportsPasswordHash = 1;
SupportsChallengeResponseAuth = 2;
}
optional string server_name = 1;
optional string server_version = 2;
optional uint32 protocol_version = 3;
optional ServerOptions server_options = 4 [default = NoOptions];
}