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* [Installer] Stop calling the payload free while an executable is locked The guard answered "nothing is holding the payload" from two lookups that can both miss a running instance: Restart Manager does not reliably report a program's own image or the modules it mapped, and the image path of a process running under another account cannot be read from the probe at all. A user log showed exactly that: the first guard passed while cockatrice.exe was running from the directory, the old uninstaller silently skipped the file it could not delete, and the update aborted half an uninstall later with "cancelled by user" after a close attempt the running window ignored. Ask the file itself. A running image is opened without write sharing, so the write open replacing it needs is refused with ERROR_SHARING_VIOLATION for as long as the program runs, while a file that is merely being read still accepts it. When neither lookup named anybody and a payload executable refuses that open, the probe answers that the file is in use and that the program holding it could not be identified - the guard's "could not confirm" dialog, whose Retry works once the user has closed it - instead of passing the payload as free. Only the payload executables are tested, not every file the purge removes: a locked executable proves a program is running and a mapped DLL belongs to a running executable, while a locked DLL or qt.conf can be the asking process itself, which is the loop the guard already had. The open is retried once after 300 ms, and only for the files that refused, so a scanner holding a file for a moment cannot stop an install for nothing. The Windows probe check now covers that answer: a payload executable held by the asking process, so that it cannot be named, has to come back as in use rather than as free. Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de> * [Installer] Close running clients over a local socket The installer could only ask a running client to close with WM_CLOSE, which an instance hidden in the notification area or sitting on its own confirmation cannot answer usefully. Give every client a per-process local socket and have the holder probe ask it there first, falling back to WM_CLOSE for clients from before the socket. * [Installer] Offer to check again or update by hand when files stay locked Replace the two-answer guard prompt with force close, close by hand and check again, or cancel. Retry the automatic close while the set of holders changes, and point a cancelled run at the latest release so a user who does not want anything killed has a way forward that is not cancelling the update again. --------- Co-authored-by: Lukas Brübach <Bruebach.Lukas@bdosecurity.de>
24 lines
1.1 KiB
C++
24 lines
1.1 KiB
C++
#ifndef INSTALLER_CLOSE_NAME_H
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#define INSTALLER_CLOSE_NAME_H
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#include <string>
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/**
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* @brief The local-socket name a running instance listens on for the installer's close
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* request.
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*
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* The name carries the process id, so every instance of the payload has its own socket - a
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* second Cockatrice that was started independently, an Oracle and a Servatrice - and the
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* installer can ask each one instead of guessing which is the primary. It also carries the
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* account name, so one user's installer cannot reach another user's session.
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*
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* This is the same string the client builds with scopedLocalServerName() in
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* libcockatrice_utility/local_server_name.h: `CockatriceInstallerClose-<pid>-<user>`. It is
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* plain C++ so the probe and the client can be tested against each other off Windows.
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*
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* @param processId the id of the process that listens on the socket
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* @param userName the account name scopedLocalServerName() appends
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*/
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std::wstring installerCloseSocketName(unsigned long processId, const std::wstring &userName);
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#endif // INSTALLER_CLOSE_NAME_H
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