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trusted_sources was checked with QString::contains. A dual-stack listener reports a local proxy as ::ffff:127.0.0.1, which never matches the default "127.0.0.1,::1". Behind nginx the forwarded client IP header was then ignored, every websocket user shared the proxy's address, and logins failed with "too many concurrent connections" once max_users_per_address was reached. Add isTrustedSource(), which parses each entry as a QHostAddress and compares exact addresses with IPv4-mapped addresses normalized, and use it at all four call sites. The ban command also read server/trusted_sources instead of the documented security/trusted_sources; it now uses the same getter. Entries that are not IP addresses are logged at startup since they no longer match anything. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
20 lines
808 B
C
20 lines
808 B
C
#ifndef TRUSTED_SOURCES_H
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#define TRUSTED_SOURCES_H
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#include <QHostAddress>
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#include <QString>
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/**
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* @brief True if @p address is listed in the comma-separated @p trustedSources (security/trusted_sources).
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*
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* Entries are parsed as addresses and compared exactly, never as substrings, so
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* 27.0.0.1 does not match 127.0.0.1. IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses compare equal to
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* their IPv4 form: a dual-stack listener reports a local proxy as ::ffff:127.0.0.1,
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* which matches a 127.0.0.1 entry. Malformed entries and null addresses never match.
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*/
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bool isTrustedSource(const QString &trustedSources, const QHostAddress &address);
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/** @brief Overload for an address in string form; an unparsable string never matches. */
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bool isTrustedSource(const QString &trustedSources, const QString &address);
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#endif
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