[Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords

Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

Took 1 minute

Took 10 seconds

Took 7 minutes
This commit is contained in:
Lukas Brübach 2026-08-04 11:36:10 +02:00 committed by GitHub
parent 048fe247f4
commit 709233d977
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
33 changed files with 834 additions and 30 deletions

View file

@ -83,6 +83,9 @@ void ConnectionController::wireClientSignals()
connect(remoteClient, &RemoteClient::sigPromptForForgotPasswordChallenge, this,
&ConnectionController::onPromptForgotPasswordChallenge);
connect(remoteClient, &RemoteClient::sigPasswordVerifierReady, this,
&ConnectionController::onPasswordVerifierReady);
}
void ConnectionController::connectToServer()
@ -91,16 +94,32 @@ void ConnectionController::connectToServer()
connect(dlgConnect, &DlgConnect::sigStartForgotPasswordRequest, this, &ConnectionController::forgotPasswordRequest);
if (dlgConnect->exec()) {
pendingSaveName = dlgConnect->getSaveName();
pendingSavePassword = dlgConnect->getSavePassword();
remoteClient->setStoredVerifier(dlgConnect->getStoredVerifier());
remoteClient->connectToServer(dlgConnect->getHost(), static_cast<unsigned int>(dlgConnect->getPort()),
dlgConnect->getPlayerName(), dlgConnect->getPassword());
}
}
void ConnectionController::onPasswordVerifierReady(const QString &verifier)
{
if (pendingSavePassword) {
SettingsCache::instance().servers().setServerPassword(pendingSaveName, verifier);
}
}
void ConnectionController::connectToServerDirect(const QString &host,
unsigned int port,
const QString &playerName,
const QString &password)
const QString &password,
const QString &storedVerifier,
const QString &saveName,
bool savePassword)
{
pendingSaveName = saveName;
pendingSavePassword = savePassword;
remoteClient->setStoredVerifier(storedVerifier);
remoteClient->connectToServer(host, port, playerName, password);
}

View file

@ -35,8 +35,13 @@ public:
void registerToServer();
void forgotPasswordRequest();
void connectToServer();
void
connectToServerDirect(const QString &host, unsigned int port, const QString &playerName, const QString &password);
void connectToServerDirect(const QString &host,
unsigned int port,
const QString &playerName,
const QString &password,
const QString &storedVerifier = QString(),
const QString &saveName = QString(),
bool savePassword = false);
void disconnectFromServer();
void refreshWindowTitle()
@ -81,6 +86,9 @@ private slots:
void onPromptForgotPasswordReset();
void onPromptForgotPasswordChallenge();
// Persists the derived scrypt verifier after a successful challenge-response login
void onPasswordVerifierReady(const QString &verifier);
private:
void wireClientSignals();
void updateWindowTitle();
@ -97,6 +105,10 @@ private:
// Kept as a member so the forgot-password signal can be wired to it
DlgConnect *dlgConnect{nullptr};
// Captured from the connect dialog when a connection is initiated
QString pendingSaveName;
bool pendingSavePassword{false};
};
#endif // COCKATRICE_REMOTE_CONNECTION_CONTROLLER_H

View file

@ -273,9 +273,15 @@ void DlgConnect::updateDisplayInfo(const QString &saveName)
playernameEdit->setText(_data.at(3));
playernameEdit->setFocus();
savePasswordCheckBox->setChecked(savePasswordStatus);
storedVerifier.clear();
if (savePasswordStatus) {
passwordEdit->setText(_data.at(4));
const QString stored = _data.at(4);
if (stored.startsWith("$")) {
storedVerifier = stored;
} else {
passwordEdit->setText(stored);
}
}
if (!_data.at(6).isEmpty()) {
@ -301,6 +307,7 @@ void DlgConnect::newHostSelected(bool state)
portEdit->setDisabled(false);
playernameEdit->clear();
passwordEdit->clear();
storedVerifier.clear();
saveEdit->clear();
saveEdit->setPlaceholderText(tr("Unique Server Name"));
saveEdit->setDisabled(false);
@ -326,6 +333,11 @@ void DlgConnect::actOk()
{
ServersSettings &servers = SettingsCache::instance().servers();
// Never write a newly typed plaintext password to disk when a verifier is already stored:
// the typed value is used for this connection and a fresh verifier is persisted after a
// successful login. Without a stored verifier we keep the previous (plaintext legacy) behavior.
const QString passwordToSave = storedVerifier.isEmpty() ? passwordEdit->text() : storedVerifier;
if (newHostButton->isChecked()) {
if (saveEdit->text().isEmpty()) {
QMessageBox::critical(this, tr("Connection Warning"), tr("You need to name your new connection profile."));
@ -333,10 +345,10 @@ void DlgConnect::actOk()
}
servers.addNewServer(saveEdit->text().trimmed(), hostEdit->text().trimmed(), portEdit->text().trimmed(),
playernameEdit->text().trimmed(), passwordEdit->text(), savePasswordCheckBox->isChecked());
playernameEdit->text().trimmed(), passwordToSave, savePasswordCheckBox->isChecked());
} else {
servers.updateExistingServer(saveEdit->text().trimmed(), hostEdit->text().trimmed(), portEdit->text().trimmed(),
playernameEdit->text().trimmed(), passwordEdit->text(),
playernameEdit->text().trimmed(), passwordToSave,
savePasswordCheckBox->isChecked());
}

View file

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "../interface/widgets/server/handle_public_servers.h"
#include "../interface/widgets/server/user/user_info_connection.h"
#include <QCheckBox>
#include <QDialog>
#include <QLineEdit>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/macros.h>
@ -47,6 +48,19 @@ public:
{
return passwordEdit->text();
}
//! \brief Stored "$scrypt$..." verifier for challenge-response servers (never the plaintext password).
[[nodiscard]] QString getStoredVerifier() const
{
return storedVerifier;
}
[[nodiscard]] QString getSaveName() const
{
return saveEdit->text();
}
[[nodiscard]] bool getSavePassword() const
{
return savePasswordCheckBox->isChecked();
}
public slots:
void downloadThePublicServers();
@ -77,6 +91,7 @@ private:
QPushButton *btnConnect, *btnForgotPassword, *btnRefreshServers, *btnDeleteServer;
QMap<QString, std::pair<QString, UserConnection_Information>> savedHostList;
HandlePublicServers *hps;
QString storedVerifier;
const QString placeHolderText = tr("Downloading...");
};
#endif

View file

@ -18,7 +18,10 @@ DlgEditPassword::DlgEditPassword(QWidget *parent) : QDialog(parent)
auto &servers = SettingsCache::instance().servers();
if (servers.getSavePassword()) {
oldPasswordEdit->setText(servers.getPassword());
const QString stored = servers.getPassword();
if (!stored.startsWith("$")) {
oldPasswordEdit->setText(stored);
}
}
oldPasswordLabel->setBuddy(oldPasswordEdit);

View file

@ -283,7 +283,9 @@ void UserInfoBox::changePassword(const QString &oldPassword, const QString &newP
{
Command_AccountPassword cmd;
cmd.set_old_password(oldPassword.toStdString());
if (client->getServerSupportsPasswordHash()) {
if (client->getServerSupportsChallengeResponse()) {
cmd.set_hashed_new_password(PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier(newPassword).toStdString());
} else if (client->getServerSupportsPasswordHash()) {
auto passwordSalt = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
QString hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::computeHash(newPassword, passwordSalt);
cmd.set_hashed_new_password(hashedPassword.toStdString());

View file

@ -871,8 +871,9 @@ void MainWindow::changeEvent(QEvent *event)
!startupDestinationConnectsToServer()) {
qCInfo(WindowMainStartupAutoconnectLog) << "Attempting auto-connect...";
DlgConnect dlg(this);
connectionController->connectToServerDirect(dlg.getHost(), static_cast<unsigned int>(dlg.getPort()),
dlg.getPlayerName(), dlg.getPassword());
connectionController->connectToServerDirect(
dlg.getHost(), static_cast<unsigned int>(dlg.getPort()), dlg.getPlayerName(), dlg.getPassword(),
dlg.getStoredVerifier(), dlg.getSaveName(), dlg.getSavePassword());
}
}
}

View file

@ -22,7 +22,8 @@
#include <libcockatrice/protocol/pending_command.h>
AbstractClient::AbstractClient(QObject *parent)
: QObject(parent), nextCmdId(0), status(StatusDisconnected), serverSupportsPasswordHash(false)
: QObject(parent), nextCmdId(0), status(StatusDisconnected), serverSupportsPasswordHash(false),
serverSupportsChallengeResponse(false)
{
qRegisterMetaType<QVariant>("QVariant");
qRegisterMetaType<CommandContainer>("CommandContainer");

View file

@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ protected:
QMap<int, PendingCommand *> pendingCommands;
QString userName, password, email, country, realName, token;
bool serverSupportsPasswordHash;
bool serverSupportsChallengeResponse;
void setStatus(ClientStatus _status);
int getNewCmdId()
{
@ -150,6 +151,10 @@ public:
{
return serverSupportsPasswordHash;
}
bool getServerSupportsChallengeResponse() const
{
return serverSupportsChallengeResponse;
}
const QString &getUserName() const
{
return userName;

View file

@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ static const unsigned int protocolVersion = 14;
RemoteClient::RemoteClient(QObject *parent, INetworkSettingsProvider *_networkSettingsProvider)
: AbstractClient(parent), networkSettingsProvider(_networkSettingsProvider), timeRunning(0), lastDataReceived(0),
messageInProgress(false), handshakeStarted(false), usingWebSocket(false), messageLength(0), hashedPassword()
messageInProgress(false), handshakeStarted(false), usingWebSocket(false), messageLength(0), hashedPassword(),
passwordNeedsMigration(false)
{
clearNewClientFeatures();
@ -114,6 +115,8 @@ void RemoteClient::processServerIdentificationEvent(const Event_ServerIdentifica
return;
}
serverSupportsPasswordHash = event.server_options() & Event_ServerIdentification::SupportsPasswordHash;
serverSupportsChallengeResponse =
event.server_options() & Event_ServerIdentification::SupportsChallengeResponseAuth;
if (getStatus() == StatusRequestingForgotPassword) {
Command_ForgotPasswordRequest cmdForgotPasswordRequest;
@ -130,7 +133,13 @@ void RemoteClient::processServerIdentificationEvent(const Event_ServerIdentifica
cmdForgotPasswordReset.set_user_name(userName.toStdString());
cmdForgotPasswordReset.set_clientid(getSrvClientID(lastHostname).toStdString());
cmdForgotPasswordReset.set_token(token.toStdString());
if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsPasswordHash) {
if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsChallengeResponse) {
hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier(password);
// Only this branch yields a challenge-response verifier worth persisting; the
// legacy-hash and plaintext branches below must not be saved under the password key.
derivedVerifier = hashedPassword;
cmdForgotPasswordReset.set_hashed_new_password(hashedPassword.toStdString());
} else if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsPasswordHash) {
auto passwordSalt = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::computeHash(password, passwordSalt);
cmdForgotPasswordReset.set_hashed_new_password(hashedPassword.toStdString());
@ -158,7 +167,10 @@ void RemoteClient::processServerIdentificationEvent(const Event_ServerIdentifica
if (getStatus() == StatusRegistering) {
Command_Register cmdRegister;
cmdRegister.set_user_name(userName.toStdString());
if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsPasswordHash) {
if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsChallengeResponse) {
hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier(password);
cmdRegister.set_hashed_password(hashedPassword.toStdString());
} else if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsPasswordHash) {
auto passwordSalt = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::computeHash(password, passwordSalt);
cmdRegister.set_hashed_password(hashedPassword.toStdString());
@ -223,7 +235,9 @@ Command_Login RemoteClient::generateCommandLogin()
void RemoteClient::doLogin()
{
if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsPasswordHash) {
if ((!password.isEmpty() || !storedVerifier.isEmpty()) && serverSupportsChallengeResponse) {
doRequestPasswordSalt(); // ask salt + nonce to build the challenge response
} else if (!password.isEmpty() && serverSupportsPasswordHash) {
//! \todo Store and log in using stored hashed password.
if (hashedPassword.isEmpty()) {
doRequestPasswordSalt(); // ask salt to create hashedPassword, then log in
@ -257,6 +271,30 @@ void RemoteClient::doHashedLogin()
sendCommand(pend);
}
void RemoteClient::doSubmitPasswordVerifier()
{
pendingVerifier = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier(password);
Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier cmdSubmitVerifier;
cmdSubmitVerifier.set_password_verifier(pendingVerifier.toStdString());
PendingCommand *pend = prepareSessionCommand(cmdSubmitVerifier);
connect(pend, &PendingCommand::finished, this, &RemoteClient::submitPasswordVerifierResponse);
sendCommand(pend);
}
void RemoteClient::submitPasswordVerifierResponse(const Response &response)
{
if (response.response_code() == Response::RespOk) {
qCDebug(RemoteClientLog) << "Password verifier migrated successfully";
if (!pendingVerifier.isEmpty()) {
emit sigPasswordVerifierReady(pendingVerifier);
pendingVerifier.clear();
}
} else {
qCWarning(RemoteClientLog) << "Failed to migrate password verifier:" << response.response_code();
}
}
void RemoteClient::processConnectionClosedEvent(const Event_ConnectionClosed & /*event*/)
{
doDisconnectFromServer();
@ -269,7 +307,59 @@ void RemoteClient::passwordSaltResponse(const Response &response)
auto passwordSalt = QString::fromStdString(resp.password_salt());
if (passwordSalt.isEmpty()) { // the server does not recognize the user but allows them to enter unregistered
password.clear(); // the password will not be used
storedVerifier.clear();
doLogin();
} else if (serverSupportsChallengeResponse && resp.has_nonce()) {
const QByteArray nonce = QByteArray::fromStdString(resp.nonce());
QByteArray key;
if (resp.needs_migration()) {
// The account still uses the legacy format; the legacy full hash
// is only derivable from the plaintext password.
if (password.isEmpty()) {
emit loginError(Response::RespClientUpdateRequired,
QStringLiteral("This account must be logged in with its password once."), 0, {});
return;
}
key = PasswordHasher::computeHash(password, passwordSalt).toUtf8();
} else if (!password.isEmpty()) {
// A hostile server must not be able to make us run or allocate for
// unreasonable scrypt parameters.
const int n = resp.has_n() ? resp.n() : SCRYPT_N;
const int r = resp.has_r() ? resp.r() : SCRYPT_R;
const int p = resp.has_p() ? resp.p() : SCRYPT_P;
if (!PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(n, r, p)) {
emit loginError(Response::RespClientUpdateRequired,
QStringLiteral("The server requested unreasonable scrypt cost parameters."), 0, {});
return;
}
key = PasswordHasher::deriveKey(password, QByteArray::fromBase64(passwordSalt.toUtf8()), n, r, p);
if (key.isEmpty()) {
emit loginError(Response::RespClientUpdateRequired, QStringLiteral("Unable to derive verifier."), 0,
{});
return;
}
derivedVerifier = QString("$scrypt$%1$%2$%3$%4$%5")
.arg(n)
.arg(r)
.arg(p)
.arg(passwordSalt)
.arg(QString(key.toBase64()));
} else if (!storedVerifier.isEmpty()) {
const PasswordVerifier verifier = PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(storedVerifier);
if (!verifier.isValid) {
emit loginError(Response::RespClientUpdateRequired, QStringLiteral("Stored verifier is invalid."),
0, {});
return;
}
key = verifier.verifier;
} else {
emit loginError(Response::RespLoginNeeded, {}, 0, {});
return;
}
passwordNeedsMigration = resp.needs_migration();
const QByteArray responseBytes = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(key, nonce);
hashedPassword = "$challenge$" + QString(nonce.toBase64()) + "$" + QString(responseBytes.toBase64());
doHashedLogin();
} else {
hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::computeHash(password, passwordSalt);
doHashedLogin();
@ -294,6 +384,14 @@ void RemoteClient::loginResponse(const Response &response)
setStatus(StatusLoggedIn);
emit userInfoChanged(resp.user_info());
if (passwordNeedsMigration) {
// The account still used the legacy password format; upgrade it to scrypt.
doSubmitPasswordVerifier();
} else if (!derivedVerifier.isEmpty()) {
emit sigPasswordVerifierReady(derivedVerifier);
derivedVerifier.clear();
}
QList<ServerInfo_User> buddyList;
for (int i = resp.buddy_list_size() - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
buddyList.append(resp.buddy_list(i));
@ -550,6 +648,8 @@ void RemoteClient::doDisconnectFromServer()
websocket->close();
}
socket->close();
derivedVerifier.clear();
pendingVerifier.clear();
}
void RemoteClient::ping()
@ -712,6 +812,12 @@ void RemoteClient::submitForgotPasswordResetResponse(const Response &response)
{
if (response.response_code() == Response::RespOk) {
emit sigForgotPasswordSuccess();
// Persist only a real scrypt verifier; a legacy hash must not be stored under
// the password key, where it would break future challenge-response logins.
if (!derivedVerifier.isEmpty()) {
emit sigPasswordVerifierReady(derivedVerifier);
derivedVerifier.clear();
}
} else {
emit sigForgotPasswordError();
}

View file

@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ signals:
unsigned int port,
const QString &_userName,
const QString &_email);
//! \brief Emitted once a scrypt verifier for the given account is known and
//! can be persisted instead of the plaintext password. The receiving side
//! should only store it for the connection it is currently negotiating, so
//! the hostname and user name are intentionally not part of the signal.
void sigPasswordVerifierReady(const QString &verifier);
private slots:
void slotConnected();
void readData();
@ -80,6 +85,8 @@ private slots:
void doLogin();
void doHashedLogin();
Command_Login generateCommandLogin();
void doSubmitPasswordVerifier();
void submitPasswordVerifierResponse(const Response &response);
void doDisconnectFromServer();
void doActivateToServer(const QString &_token);
void doRequestForgotPasswordToServer(const QString &hostname, unsigned int port, const QString &_userName);
@ -111,6 +118,14 @@ private:
QString lastHostname;
unsigned int lastPort;
QString hashedPassword;
bool passwordNeedsMigration;
//! \brief A previously stored "$scrypt$..." verifier used to authenticate
//! without the plaintext password.
QString storedVerifier;
//! \brief Verifier derived during the current login, persisted after success.
QString derivedVerifier;
//! \brief Verifier sent for migration, persisted once the server accepts it.
QString pendingVerifier;
QString getSrvClientID(const QString &_hostname);
bool newMissingFeatureFound(const QString &_serversMissingFeatures);
@ -149,6 +164,12 @@ public:
}
void
connectToServer(const QString &hostname, unsigned int port, const QString &_userName, const QString &_password);
//! \brief Provide a stored "$scrypt$..." verifier so the client can
//! authenticate without the plaintext password.
void setStoredVerifier(const QString &verifier)
{
storedVerifier = verifier;
}
void registerToServer(const QString &hostname,
unsigned int port,
const QString &_userName,

View file

@ -85,6 +85,11 @@ public:
{
return QMap<QString, bool>();
}
/** @brief True when only challenge-response logins are accepted (strict mode). */
virtual bool requiresChallengeResponseAuth() const
{
return false;
}
void addClient(Server_ProtocolHandler *player);
void removeClient(Server_ProtocolHandler *player);
QList<QString> getOnlineModeratorList() const;

View file

@ -40,6 +40,14 @@ public:
{
return {};
}
virtual QString getUserPasswordData(const QString & /* user */)
{
return {};
}
virtual bool submitPasswordVerifier(const QString & /* user */, const QString & /* passwordVerifier */)
{
return false;
}
virtual QMap<QString, ServerInfo_User> getBuddyList(const QString & /* name */)
{
return QMap<QString, ServerInfo_User>();

View file

@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ Server_ProtocolHandler::~Server_ProtocolHandler()
{
}
void Server_ProtocolHandler::setAuthNonce(const QByteArray &nonce)
{
authNonce = nonce;
authNonceCreated = QDateTime::currentDateTimeUtc();
}
bool Server_ProtocolHandler::isAuthNonceValid(const QByteArray &nonce) const
{
return !authNonce.isEmpty() && authNonce == nonce && authNonceCreated.secsTo(QDateTime::currentDateTimeUtc()) < 60;
}
void Server_ProtocolHandler::clearAuthNonce()
{
authNonce.clear();
}
// This function must only be called from the thread this object lives in.
// Except when the server is shutting down.
// The thread must not hold any server locks when calling this (e.g. clientsLock, roomsLock).
@ -507,6 +523,16 @@ Response::ResponseCode Server_ProtocolHandler::cmdLogin(const Command_Login &cmd
return Response::RespContextError;
}
// In strict mode only challenge-response logins are accepted.
if (server->requiresChallengeResponseAuth() &&
(!cmd.has_hashed_password() || cmd.hashed_password().rfind("$challenge$", 0) != 0)) {
auto *re = new Response_Login;
re->set_denied_reason_str("Client upgrade required");
re->add_missing_features("challenge_response_auth");
rc.setResponseExtension(re);
return Response::RespClientUpdateRequired;
}
// check client feature set against server feature set
FeatureSet features;
QMap<QString, bool> receivedClientFeatures;

View file

@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#include "server.h"
#include "server_abstractuserinterface.h"
#include <QByteArray>
#include <QDateTime>
#include <QObject>
#include <libcockatrice/protocol/pb/response.pb.h>
#include <libcockatrice/protocol/pb/server_message.pb.h>
@ -55,6 +57,8 @@ protected:
bool acceptsUserListChanges;
bool acceptsRoomListChanges;
bool idleClientWarningSent;
QByteArray authNonce;
QDateTime authNonceCreated;
virtual void logDebugMessage(const QString & /* message */)
{
}
@ -124,6 +128,13 @@ public:
return databaseInterface;
}
/** @brief Store a fresh challenge nonce for the next challenge-response login attempt. */
void setAuthNonce(const QByteArray &nonce);
/** @brief True if nonce matches the pending one and was issued less than 60 seconds ago. */
bool isAuthNonceValid(const QByteArray &nonce) const;
/** @brief Invalidate the pending nonce (single-use). */
void clearAuthNonce();
int getLastCommandTime() const
{
return timeRunning - lastDataReceived;

View file

@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ void FeatureSet::initalizeFeatureList(QMap<QString, bool> &_featureList)
_featureList.insert("idle_client", false);
_featureList.insert("forgot_password", false);
_featureList.insert("websocket", false);
// featureList.insert("hashed_password_login", false);
_featureList.insert("hashed_password_login", false);
_featureList.insert("challenge_response_auth", false);
// These are temp to force users onto a newer client
_featureList.insert("2.7.0_min_version", false);
_featureList.insert("2.8.0_min_version", false);

View file

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ message Event_ServerIdentification {
enum ServerOptions {
NoOptions = 0;
SupportsPasswordHash = 1;
SupportsChallengeResponseAuth = 2;
}
optional string server_name = 1;
optional string server_version = 2;

View file

@ -6,4 +6,14 @@ message Response_PasswordSalt {
optional Response_PasswordSalt ext = 1017;
}
optional string password_salt = 1;
// scrypt cost parameters for password_salt. Absent/zero for legacy accounts.
optional int32 n = 2;
optional int32 r = 3;
optional int32 p = 4;
// Server-generated challenge. When present the client must authenticate
// with a challenge-response instead of transmitting the password hash.
optional bytes nonce = 5;
// True when the account still uses the legacy password format and should
// be migrated to the scrypt format after a successful login.
optional bool needs_migration = 6;
}

View file

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ message SessionCommand {
FORGOT_PASSWORD_CHALLENGE = 1023;
REQUEST_PASSWORD_SALT = 1024;
SET_CARD_ART_PARAMS = 1025;
SUBMIT_PASSWORD_VERIFIER = 1026;
REPLAY_LIST = 1100;
REPLAY_DOWNLOAD = 1101;
REPLAY_MODIFY_MATCH = 1102;
@ -223,3 +224,14 @@ message Command_SetCardArtParams {
optional double vertical_offset = 5;
optional double zoom = 6;
}
// Client uploads the new password verifier to migrate a legacy account
// after a successful challenge-response login. Idempotent; only applies
// to accounts still using the legacy password format.
message Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier {
extend SessionCommand {
optional Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier ext = 1026;
}
// Full verifier string to store, e.g. "$scrypt$32768$8$1$<salt>$<verifier>"
required string password_verifier = 1;
}

View file

@ -146,6 +146,14 @@ void ServersSettings::setFPPlayerName(QString playerName)
setValue(playerName, "fpPlayerName");
}
void ServersSettings::setServerPassword(const QString &saveName, const QString &password)
{
const int index = getPrevioushostindex(saveName);
if (index >= 0) {
setValue(password, QString("password%1").arg(index), "server", "server_details");
}
}
QString ServersSettings::getFPPlayerName(QString defaultName) const
{
QVariant name = getValue("fpPlayerName");

View file

@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ public:
void setFPHostName(QString hostname);
void setFPPort(QString port);
void setFPPlayerName(QString playerName);
//! \brief Store a password (or a "$scrypt$..." verifier) for the given saved server.
void setServerPassword(const QString &saveName, const QString &password);
void addNewServer(const QString &saveName,
const QString &serv,
const QString &port,

View file

@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
#include <QCryptographicHash>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/cryptoutil.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
QString PasswordHasher::computeHash(const QString &password, const QString &salt)
{
@ -52,3 +55,114 @@ QString PasswordHasher::generateActivationToken()
{
return QString(CryptoUtil::randomBytes(16).toBase64().left(16));
}
QByteArray PasswordHasher::deriveKey(const QString &password, const QByteArray &salt, int n, int r, int p)
{
QByteArray key(SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH, '\0');
const QByteArray passwordUtf8 = password.toUtf8();
// EVP_PBE_scrypt aborts unless maxmem covers the required working memory,
// which is roughly 128 * n * r bytes (plus the small Salsa20/8 block array).
const auto maxmem = static_cast<quint64>(128) * n * r + static_cast<quint64>(128) * r * p + 4096;
if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(passwordUtf8.constData(), passwordUtf8.size(),
reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(salt.constData()), salt.size(), n, r, p, maxmem,
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(key.data()), key.size()) != 1) {
return QByteArray();
}
return key;
}
bool PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(int n, int r, int p)
{
// Bounds adopted during review: n in [1024, 2**20] and a power of two, r in [1, 32],
// p in [1, 16]. Anything else is rejected before we allocate or derive for it.
return n >= 1024 && n <= (1 << 20) && (n & (n - 1)) == 0 && r >= 1 && r <= 32 && p >= 1 && p <= 16;
}
QString PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier(const QString &password)
{
const QByteArray salt = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(SCRYPT_SALT_LENGTH);
const QByteArray verifier = deriveKey(password, salt, SCRYPT_N, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P);
return QString("$scrypt$%1$%2$%3$%4$%5")
.arg(SCRYPT_N)
.arg(SCRYPT_R)
.arg(SCRYPT_P)
.arg(QString(salt.toBase64()))
.arg(QString(verifier.toBase64()));
}
PasswordVerifier PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(const QString &stored)
{
PasswordVerifier result;
const QStringList parts = stored.split("$");
if (parts.size() != 7 || parts.at(1) != "scrypt") {
return result;
}
bool ok = false;
const int n = parts.at(2).toInt(&ok);
if (!ok) {
return result;
}
const int r = parts.at(3).toInt(&ok);
if (!ok) {
return result;
}
const int p = parts.at(4).toInt(&ok);
if (!ok || !costParamsAreSane(n, r, p)) {
return result;
}
const QByteArray salt = QByteArray::fromBase64(parts.at(5).toUtf8());
const QByteArray verifier = QByteArray::fromBase64(parts.at(6).toUtf8());
if (salt.isEmpty() || verifier.size() != SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH) {
return result;
}
result.format = PasswordFormat::Scrypt;
result.n = n;
result.r = r;
result.p = p;
result.salt = salt;
result.verifier = verifier;
result.isValid = true;
return result;
}
bool PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(const QString &stored)
{
return !stored.startsWith("$");
}
bool PasswordHasher::verifyPassword(const QString &password, const QString &storedPasswordData)
{
if (isLegacyFormat(storedPasswordData)) {
return storedPasswordData == computeHash(password, storedPasswordData.left(16));
}
const PasswordVerifier verifier = parsePasswordVerifier(storedPasswordData);
if (!verifier.isValid) {
return false;
}
const QByteArray derived = deriveKey(password, verifier.salt, verifier.n, verifier.r, verifier.p);
return !derived.isEmpty() && constantTimeEquals(derived, verifier.verifier);
}
QByteArray PasswordHasher::computeResponse(const QByteArray &key, const QByteArray &nonce)
{
QByteArray response(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, '\0');
unsigned int responseLength = 0;
if (HMAC(EVP_sha256(), key.constData(), key.size(), reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(nonce.constData()),
nonce.size(), reinterpret_cast<unsigned char *>(response.data()), &responseLength) == nullptr) {
qFatal("PasswordHasher::computeResponse: HMAC failed");
}
response.resize(responseLength);
return response;
}
bool PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(const QByteArray &a, const QByteArray &b)
{
if (a.size() != b.size()) {
return false;
}
return CRYPTO_memcmp(a.constData(), b.constData(), a.size()) == 0;
}

View file

@ -1,14 +1,57 @@
#ifndef PASSWORDHASHER_H
#define PASSWORDHASHER_H
#include <QByteArray>
#include <QObject>
// scrypt cost parameters used for newly created password verifiers. These match
// the RFC 7914 recommended parameters for interactive use.
constexpr int SCRYPT_N = 32768;
constexpr int SCRYPT_R = 8;
constexpr int SCRYPT_P = 1;
constexpr int SCRYPT_SALT_LENGTH = 16;
constexpr int SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH = 64;
enum class PasswordFormat
{
None = 0,
Scrypt
};
struct PasswordVerifier
{
PasswordFormat format = PasswordFormat::None;
int n = 0;
int r = 0;
int p = 0;
QByteArray salt;
QByteArray verifier;
bool isValid = false;
};
class PasswordHasher
{
public:
static QString computeHash(const QString &password, const QString &salt);
static QString generateRandomSalt(const int len = 16);
static QString generateActivationToken();
/** @brief Derive the scrypt verifier for the given password, salt and cost parameters. Empty on failure. */
static QByteArray deriveKey(const QString &password, const QByteArray &salt, int n, int r, int p);
/** @brief True if the scrypt cost parameters are acceptable for server and client use. */
static bool costParamsAreSane(int n, int r, int p);
/** @brief Build a "$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" string with a fresh random salt. */
static QString generatePasswordVerifier(const QString &password);
/** @brief Parse a stored "$scrypt$..." string into its components. */
static PasswordVerifier parsePasswordVerifier(const QString &stored);
/** @brief True if the stored value is not in the scrypt format (legacy salt+hash). */
static bool isLegacyFormat(const QString &stored);
/** @brief True if the password matches the stored credential, whether legacy salt+hash or scrypt. */
static bool verifyPassword(const QString &password, const QString &storedPasswordData);
/** @brief HMAC-SHA256 of nonce keyed with the password verifier, used for challenge-response logins. */
static QByteArray computeResponse(const QByteArray &key, const QByteArray &nonce);
/** @brief Constant-time byte comparison. */
static bool constantTimeEquals(const QByteArray &a, const QByteArray &b);
};
#endif

View file

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-- Servatrice db migration from version 36 to version 37
-- The column must hold "$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" (up to ~255 chars) and arbitrary
-- legacy base64 hashes, so it grows beyond the old 120-char size. varchar(255) is used as the
-- column type is promotion-safe and avoids the row-format change ALGORITHM=INSTANT cannot do.
ALTER TABLE `cockatrice_users` MODIFY `password_sha512` varchar(255) NOT NULL;
UPDATE cockatrice_schema_version SET version=37 WHERE version=36;

View file

@ -350,6 +350,22 @@ max_users_websocket=500
; Maximum number of users that can connect from the same IP address; useful to avoid bots, default is 4
max_users_per_address=4
; How strictly new authentication features are enforced. Possible values:
; * legacy: accounts that still use the legacy 1000-round SHA-512 hash keep logging in with it
; (they are served the legacy salt, never a challenge-response nonce) and are never
; auto-migrated to scrypt. Already-migrated scrypt rows keep logging in via
; challenge-response. New credentials may use either format;
; * mixed: accept both legacy hashes and challenge-response authentication (default);
; * strict: only accept challenge-response authentication from clients that support it,
; and reject plain password submissions. Legacy accounts are migrated to scrypt
; automatically on their next successful login.
;
; Challenge-response verifiers are scrypt (RFC 7914, N=32768, r=8, p=1) stored as
; "$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>". The stored verifier is password-equivalent:
; plaintext passwords never reach the client configuration and never go over the wire, but
; a database dump yields credentials that can answer a login challenge directly.
authentication_strictness=mixed
; You may want to allow an unlimited number of users from a trusted source. This setting can contain a
; comma-separed list of IP addresses which will allow an unlimited number of connections from each of the
; IP addresses listed (ignoring the max_users_per_address). Default is "127.0.0.1,::1"; example: "192.73.233.244,81.4.100.74"

View file

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `cockatrice_schema_version` (
PRIMARY KEY (`version`)
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8mb4 DEFAULT COLLATE utf8mb4_unicode_ci;
INSERT INTO cockatrice_schema_version VALUES(36);
INSERT INTO cockatrice_schema_version VALUES(37);
-- users and user data tables
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `cockatrice_users` (
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `cockatrice_users` (
`admin` tinyint(1) NOT NULL,
`name` varchar(35) NOT NULL,
`realname` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`password_sha512` char(120) NOT NULL,
`password_sha512` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`email` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`country` char(2) NOT NULL,
`avatar_bmp` mediumblob NOT NULL,

View file

@ -900,6 +900,18 @@ QString Servatrice::getRequiredFeatures() const
return settingsCache->value("server/requiredfeatures", "").toString();
}
Servatrice::AuthenticationStrictness Servatrice::getAuthenticationStrictness() const
{
const QString strictness = settingsCache->value("security/authentication_strictness", "mixed").toString();
if (strictness == "strict") {
return AuthenticationStrict;
}
if (strictness == "legacy") {
return AuthenticationLegacy;
}
return AuthenticationMixed;
}
QString Servatrice::getDBTypeString() const
{
if (QProcessEnvironment::systemEnvironment().contains("DATABASE_URL")) {

View file

@ -140,6 +140,12 @@ public:
AuthenticationSql,
AuthenticationPassword
};
enum AuthenticationStrictness
{
AuthenticationLegacy,
AuthenticationMixed,
AuthenticationStrict
};
private slots:
void statusUpdate();
void shutdownTimeout();
@ -219,6 +225,10 @@ public:
{
return serverRequiredFeatureList;
}
bool requiresChallengeResponseAuth() const override
{
return getAuthenticationStrictness() == AuthenticationStrict;
}
QString getServerName() const;
QString getLoginMessage() const override
{
@ -240,6 +250,7 @@ public:
{
return authenticationMethod;
}
AuthenticationStrictness getAuthenticationStrictness() const;
bool permitUnregisteredUsers() const override
{
return authenticationMethod != AuthenticationNone;

View file

@ -356,6 +356,47 @@ AuthenticationResult Servatrice_DatabaseInterface::checkUserPassword(Server_Prot
qCWarning(DatabaseInterfaceLog) << "Login denied: user not active";
return UserIsInactive;
}
if (password.startsWith("$challenge$")) {
// Challenge-response login: verify HMAC(stored_key, nonce) without
// ever transmitting the stored credential or password hash.
const QStringList parts = password.split("$");
if (parts.size() != 4) {
return NotLoggedIn;
}
const QByteArray nonce = QByteArray::fromBase64(parts.at(2).toUtf8());
const QByteArray response = QByteArray::fromBase64(parts.at(3).toUtf8());
if (nonce.isEmpty() || response.isEmpty() || !handler->isAuthNonceValid(nonce)) {
return NotLoggedIn;
}
QByteArray key;
if (PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(correctPasswordSha512)) {
key = correctPasswordSha512.toUtf8();
} else {
// Design note: the stored scrypt verifier IS the challenge-response key, so a
// database dump yields credentials that can answer a login challenge directly.
// We deliberately accept this trade: it removes plaintext passwords from the
// client config and from the wire, but does not protect against DB compromise.
// A password-equivalent proof scheme (e.g. SRP-6a/OPAQUE) would be the proper
// escalation and is out of scope here.
const PasswordVerifier verifier = PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(correctPasswordSha512);
if (!verifier.isValid) {
return NotLoggedIn;
}
key = verifier.verifier;
}
const QByteArray expected = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(key, nonce);
handler->clearAuthNonce();
if (PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(expected, response)) {
qCDebug(DatabaseInterfaceLog) << "Login accepted: challenge-response password right";
return PasswordRight;
}
qCDebug(DatabaseInterfaceLog) << "Login denied: challenge-response password wrong";
return NotLoggedIn;
}
QString hashedPassword;
if (passwordNeedsHash) {
hashedPassword = PasswordHasher::computeHash(password, correctPasswordSha512.left(16));
@ -558,6 +599,48 @@ QString Servatrice_DatabaseInterface::getUserSalt(const QString &user)
return {};
}
QString Servatrice_DatabaseInterface::getUserPasswordData(const QString &user)
{
if (server->getAuthenticationMethod() != Servatrice::AuthenticationSql) {
return {};
}
checkSql();
QSqlQuery *query = prepareQuery("SELECT password_sha512 FROM {prefix}_users WHERE name = :name");
query->bindValue(":name", user);
if (!execSqlQuery(query)) {
return {};
}
if (!query->next()) {
return {};
}
return query->value(0).toString();
}
bool Servatrice_DatabaseInterface::submitPasswordVerifier(const QString &user, const QString &passwordVerifier)
{
if (server->getAuthenticationMethod() != Servatrice::AuthenticationSql) {
return false;
}
checkSql();
// Only migrate accounts that still use the legacy format; the query is a no-op otherwise.
QSqlQuery *query = prepareQuery(
"update {prefix}_users set password_sha512 = :verifier where name = :user and password_sha512 not like '$%'");
query->bindValue(":verifier", passwordVerifier);
query->bindValue(":user", user);
if (!execSqlQuery(query)) {
qCWarning(DatabaseInterfaceLog) << "Failed to submit password verifier for user" << user << query->lastError();
return false;
}
// The guard makes a re-migration a no-op; only report success when a row was actually updated.
return query->numRowsAffected() > 0;
}
int Servatrice_DatabaseInterface::getUserIdInDB(const QString &name)
{
if (server->getAuthenticationMethod() == Servatrice::AuthenticationSql) {
@ -1139,13 +1222,13 @@ bool Servatrice_DatabaseInterface::changeUserPassword(const QString &user,
return false;
}
const QString correctPasswordSha512 = passwordQuery->value(0).toString();
QString oldPasswordSha512 = oldPassword;
if (oldPasswordNeedsHash) {
QString salt = correctPasswordSha512.left(16);
oldPasswordSha512 = PasswordHasher::computeHash(oldPassword, salt);
}
if (correctPasswordSha512 != oldPasswordSha512) {
const QString storedPassword = passwordQuery->value(0).toString();
// oldPasswordNeedsHash means the client sent the old password in plaintext. Verify it
// against whatever is stored: legacy salt+hash rows or already-migrated scrypt rows
// (which must NOT be re-hashed with a salt torn out of the "$scrypt$..." string).
const bool oldPasswordMatches = oldPasswordNeedsHash ? PasswordHasher::verifyPassword(oldPassword, storedPassword)
: (oldPassword == storedPassword);
if (!oldPasswordMatches) {
return false;
}

View file

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include <server.h>
#include <server_database_interface.h>
#define DATABASE_SCHEMA_VERSION 36
#define DATABASE_SCHEMA_VERSION 37
class Servatrice;
@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ public:
bool activeUserExists(const QString &user) override;
bool userExists(const QString &user) override;
QString getUserSalt(const QString &user) override;
QString getUserPasswordData(const QString &user) override;
bool submitPasswordVerifier(const QString &user, const QString &passwordVerifier) override;
int getUserIdInDB(const QString &name);
QMap<QString, ServerInfo_User> getBuddyList(const QString &name) override;
QMap<QString, ServerInfo_User> getIgnoreList(const QString &name) override;

View file

@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
#include <libcockatrice/protocol/pb/serverinfo_user.pb.h>
#include <libcockatrice/protocol/pb/serverinfo_user_alt.pb.h>
#include <libcockatrice/protocol/pb/serverinfo_user_session.pb.h>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/cryptoutil.h>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/passwordhasher.h>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/string_limits.h>
#include <libcockatrice/utility/warning_categories.h>
@ -139,7 +140,14 @@ bool AbstractServerSocketInterface::initSession()
identEvent.set_server_version(VERSION_STRING);
identEvent.set_protocol_version(protocolVersion);
if (servatrice->getAuthenticationMethod() == Servatrice::AuthenticationSql) {
identEvent.set_server_options(Event_ServerIdentification::SupportsPasswordHash);
// Challenge-response is advertised in every strictness mode: legacy accounts keep
// logging in with the legacy hash, but already-migrated scrypt rows are always
// served challenge-response (authentication_strictness only governs NEW credentials).
Event_ServerIdentification::ServerOptions serverOptions =
static_cast<Event_ServerIdentification::ServerOptions>(
Event_ServerIdentification::SupportsPasswordHash |
Event_ServerIdentification::SupportsChallengeResponseAuth);
identEvent.set_server_options(serverOptions);
}
SessionEvent *identSe = prepareSessionEvent(identEvent);
sendProtocolItem(*identSe);
@ -257,6 +265,8 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::processExtendedSessionComm
return cmdReportAddComment(cmd.GetExtension(Command_ReportAddComment::ext), rc);
case SessionCommand::REPORT_DETAILS:
return cmdReportDetails(cmd.GetExtension(Command_ReportDetails::ext), rc);
case SessionCommand::SUBMIT_PASSWORD_VERIFIER:
return cmdSubmitPasswordVerifier(cmd.GetExtension(Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier::ext), rc);
default:
return Response::RespFunctionNotAllowed;
}
@ -2461,6 +2471,11 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdRegisterAccount(const C
password = QString::fromStdString(cmd.hashed_password());
}
// Reject credential formats the configured authentication strictness does not accept.
if (!acceptsCredentialFormat(passwordNeedsHash, password)) {
return Response::RespClientUpdateRequired;
}
bool requireEmailActivation = settingsCache->value("registration/requireemailactivation", true).toBool();
bool regSucceeded = sqlInterface->registerUser(userName, realName, password, passwordNeedsHash, parsedEmailAddress,
country, !requireEmailActivation);
@ -2507,6 +2522,21 @@ bool AbstractServerSocketInterface::tooManyRegistrationAttempts(const QString &i
return false;
}
bool AbstractServerSocketInterface::acceptsCredentialFormat(bool passwordNeedsHash, const QString &password) const
{
// "scryptFormat" means the client sent a derived verifier rather than a password to hash ourselves.
const bool scryptFormat = !passwordNeedsHash && !PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(password);
// The strictness mode governs how existing legacy accounts are served, not which new-credential
// formats are tolerated: a legacy-mode server must still accept scrypt verifiers, because clients
// derive them whenever challenge-response is advertised (and it must be, so already-migrated
// scrypt rows keep logging in). strict is the only mode that rejects legacy formats.
if (servatrice->getAuthenticationStrictness() == Servatrice::AuthenticationStrict) {
return scryptFormat;
}
return true; // legacy and mixed accept either format
}
Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdActivateAccount(const Command_Activate &cmd,
ResponseContainer & /*rc*/)
{
@ -2841,6 +2871,11 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdAccountPassword(const C
newPassword = QString::fromStdString(cmd.hashed_new_password());
}
// Reject new credential formats the configured authentication strictness does not accept.
if (!acceptsCredentialFormat(newPasswordNeedsHash, newPassword)) {
return Response::RespClientUpdateRequired;
}
QString userName = QString::fromStdString(userInfo->name());
if (!databaseInterface->changeUserPassword(userName, oldPassword, true, newPassword, newPasswordNeedsHash)) {
return Response::RespWrongPassword;
@ -2978,6 +3013,11 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdForgotPasswordReset(con
password = QString::fromStdString(cmd.hashed_new_password());
}
// Reject new credential formats the configured authentication strictness does not accept.
if (!acceptsCredentialFormat(passwordNeedsHash, password)) {
return Response::RespClientUpdateRequired;
}
if (sqlInterface->changeUserPassword(nameFromStdString(cmd.user_name()), password, passwordNeedsHash)) {
if (servatrice->getEnableForgotPasswordAudit()) {
sqlInterface->addAuditRecord(userName.simplified(), this->getAddress(), clientId.simplified(),
@ -3038,8 +3078,8 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdRequestPasswordSalt(con
ResponseContainer &rc)
{
const QString userName = nameFromStdString(cmd.user_name());
QString passwordSalt = sqlInterface->getUserSalt(userName);
if (passwordSalt.isEmpty()) {
const QString storedPasswordData = sqlInterface->getUserPasswordData(userName);
if (storedPasswordData.isEmpty()) {
if (server->getRegOnlyServerEnabled()) {
return Response::RespRegistrationRequired;
} else {
@ -3047,8 +3087,36 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdRequestPasswordSalt(con
return Response::RespOk;
}
}
auto *re = new Response_PasswordSalt;
re->set_password_salt(passwordSalt.toStdString());
if (PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(storedPasswordData)) {
re->set_password_salt(storedPasswordData.left(16).toStdString());
re->set_needs_migration(true);
// Legacy rows get a challenge-response nonce only outside legacy mode (there the client
// logs in with the legacy hash and the account is migrated). In legacy mode the row is
// served the legacy salt, since legacy mode only governs what NEW credentials are accepted.
if (servatrice->getAuthenticationStrictness() != Servatrice::AuthenticationLegacy) {
const QByteArray nonce = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
setAuthNonce(nonce);
re->set_nonce(nonce.constData(), nonce.size());
}
} else {
const PasswordVerifier verifier = PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(storedPasswordData);
if (!verifier.isValid) {
delete re;
return Response::RespContextError;
}
re->set_password_salt(QString(verifier.salt.toBase64()).toStdString());
re->set_n(verifier.n);
re->set_r(verifier.r);
re->set_p(verifier.p);
re->set_needs_migration(false);
// scrypt rows are served challenge-response in every mode so migrated accounts never lock out.
const QByteArray nonce = CryptoUtil::randomBytes(32);
setAuthNonce(nonce);
re->set_nonce(nonce.constData(), nonce.size());
}
rc.setResponseExtension(re);
return Response::RespOk;
}
@ -3147,6 +3215,39 @@ Response::ResponseCode AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdReport(const Command_Re
return Response::RespOk;
}
Response::ResponseCode
AbstractServerSocketInterface::cmdSubmitPasswordVerifier(const Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier &cmd,
ResponseContainer & /*rc*/)
{
if (authState != PasswordRight) {
return Response::RespLoginNeeded;
}
// Limit to the size of the database column (password_sha512 varchar(255)).
constexpr int MAX_PASSWORD_VERIFIER_LENGTH = 255;
const QString passwordVerifier = QString::fromStdString(cmd.password_verifier());
if (passwordVerifier.isEmpty() || passwordVerifier.length() > MAX_PASSWORD_VERIFIER_LENGTH ||
PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(passwordVerifier)) {
return Response::RespContextError;
}
// Reject unparseable or hostile cost parameters before they reach the database.
const PasswordVerifier parsedVerifier = PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(passwordVerifier);
if (!parsedVerifier.isValid) {
qCWarning(AbstractServerSocketInterfaceLog)
<< "Rejecting password verifier submission with invalid or insane cost parameters";
return Response::RespContextError;
}
if (!sqlInterface->submitPasswordVerifier(QString::fromStdString(userInfo->name()), passwordVerifier)) {
return Response::RespContextError;
}
qCDebug(AbstractServerSocketInterfaceLog)
<< "Password verifier migrated for user" << QString::fromStdString(userInfo->name());
return Response::RespOk;
}
// ADMIN FUNCTIONS.
// Permission is checked by the calling function.

View file

@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ signals:
protected:
void logDebugMessage(const QString &message) override;
bool tooManyRegistrationAttempts(const QString &ipAddress);
bool acceptsCredentialFormat(bool passwordNeedsHash, const QString &password) const;
virtual void writeToSocket(QByteArray &data) = 0;
virtual void flushSocket() = 0;
@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ private:
Response::ResponseCode cmdReportDetails(const Command_ReportDetails &cmd, ResponseContainer &rc);
Response::ResponseCode cmdReportAddComment(const Command_ReportAddComment &cmd, ResponseContainer &rc);
Response::ResponseCode cmdReplayDownloadByGameId(const Command_ReplayDownloadByGameId &cmd, ResponseContainer &rc);
Response::ResponseCode cmdSubmitPasswordVerifier(const Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier &cmd, ResponseContainer &rc);
Response::ResponseCode
processExtendedSessionCommand(int cmdType, const SessionCommand &cmd, ResponseContainer &rc) override;
Response::ResponseCode

View file

@ -36,6 +36,137 @@ TEST(PasswordHashTest, TokenHasExpectedLength)
const QString token = PasswordHasher::generateActivationToken();
ASSERT_EQ(token.size(), 16);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, DeriveKeyMatchesKnownVector)
{
// RFC 7914 scrypt test vector, P="password", S="NaCl", N=1024, r=8, p=16
const QByteArray expected = QByteArray::fromHex("fdbabe1c9d3472007856e7190d01e9fe7c6ad7cbc8237830e77376634b"
"3731622eaf30d92e22a3886ff109279d9830dac727afb94a83ee6d8360cb"
"dfa2cc0640");
const QByteArray derived = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 1024, 8, 16);
ASSERT_EQ(derived.toHex(), expected.toHex());
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, PasswordVerifierRoundTrip)
{
const QString stored = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier("hunter2");
ASSERT_FALSE(stored.isEmpty());
ASSERT_TRUE(stored.startsWith("$scrypt$"));
const PasswordVerifier parsed = PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(stored);
ASSERT_TRUE(parsed.isValid);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.format, PasswordFormat::Scrypt);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.n, SCRYPT_N);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.r, SCRYPT_R);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.p, SCRYPT_P);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.salt.size(), SCRYPT_SALT_LENGTH);
ASSERT_EQ(parsed.verifier.size(), SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, PasswordVerifierInvalidInput)
{
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("garbage").isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("$scrypt$not-an-int$8$1$AAAA$BBBB").isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("$scrypt$1024$8$1$AAAA$too-short").isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier("$pbkdf2-sha512$1000$AAAA$BBBB").isValid);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, LegacyFormatDetection)
{
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat("salt+hash"));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::isLegacyFormat(PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier("password")));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, DeriveKeyDependsOnCostParameters)
{
const QByteArray keyA = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 1024, 8, 16);
const QByteArray keyB = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 2048, 8, 16);
const QByteArray keyC = PasswordHasher::deriveKey("password", QByteArray("NaCl"), 1024, 8, 1);
ASSERT_NE(keyA, keyB);
ASSERT_NE(keyA, keyC);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, ComputeResponseIsDeterministic)
{
const QByteArray nonce = QByteArray("a nonce value");
const QByteArray key = QByteArray("the verifier bytes");
const QByteArray r1 = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(key, nonce);
const QByteArray r2 = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(key, nonce);
const QByteArray r3 = PasswordHasher::computeResponse(QByteArray("a different key"), nonce);
ASSERT_EQ(r1, r2);
ASSERT_NE(r1, r3);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, ConstantTimeEquals)
{
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(QByteArray("same"), QByteArray("same")));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(QByteArray("same"), QByteArray("diff")));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::constantTimeEquals(QByteArray("short"), QByteArray("longer")));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, CostParamsAreSane)
{
// Accept the recommended interactive parameters and the RFC 7914 test vector's.
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(SCRYPT_N, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P));
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 8, 16));
// n must be in [1024, 2**20] and a power of two.
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(512, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1 << 21, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1025, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(0, 8, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(-1024, 8, 1));
// r in [1, 32], p in [1, 16].
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 0, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 33, 1));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 8, 0));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::costParamsAreSane(1024, 8, 17));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, ParsePasswordVerifierRejectsHostileCostParams)
{
// 16 bytes of salt and 64 bytes of verifier, base64 encoded.
const QString saltB64 = QLatin1String("c2FsdHNhbHRzYWx0c2FsdA==");
const QString verifierB64 = QString(QByteArray(SCRYPT_VERIFIER_LENGTH, '\x42').toBase64());
ASSERT_TRUE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1024$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64)).isValid);
// n not a power of two, below 1024, or above 2**20.
ASSERT_FALSE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1025$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64)).isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$512$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64)).isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(
PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1073741824$8$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64))
.isValid);
// r and p out of range.
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1024$33$1$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64))
.isValid);
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::parsePasswordVerifier(QString("$scrypt$1024$8$17$%1$%2").arg(saltB64).arg(verifierB64))
.isValid);
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, VerifyPasswordLegacyRow)
{
const QString salt = PasswordHasher::generateRandomSalt();
const QString legacyStored = PasswordHasher::computeHash("correct horse", salt);
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("correct horse", legacyStored));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("battery staple", legacyStored));
}
TEST(PasswordHashTest, VerifyPasswordScryptRow)
{
const QString scryptStored = PasswordHasher::generatePasswordVerifier("correct horse");
// Regression for the changeUserPassword bug that re-hashed the old password with
// a 16-char salt torn out of the "$scrypt$..." string, which could never match.
ASSERT_TRUE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("correct horse", scryptStored));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("battery staple", scryptStored));
ASSERT_FALSE(PasswordHasher::verifyPassword("correct horse", "garbage"));
}
} // namespace
int main(int argc, char **argv)