[Security] Add challenge-response auth with scrypt verifiers and stop storing plaintext passwords

Challenge-response authentication: the client derives a scrypt verifier
(RFC 7914, EVP_PBE_scrypt, N=32768, r=8, p=1) and authenticates with
HMAC-SHA256(key, nonce), so neither the password nor its hash is
transmitted. The stored format becomes
"$scrypt$<n>$<r>$<p>$<salt>$<verifier>" and Response_PasswordSalt
now carries the cost parameters. Strict servers only accept scrypt
verifiers; legacy accounts are migrated after a successful login.

Fix #344 for challenge-response servers: a saved profile stores the
derived verifier under the password key instead of the plaintext password.
The connect dialog loads it without revealing it, autoconnect passes it
through, the change-password dialog no longer prefills the old password
field with it, and the client only persists the verifier when
"Save password" is checked.

Took 3 minutes

Took 1 minute

Took 10 seconds

Took 7 minutes
This commit is contained in:
Lukas Brübach 2026-08-04 11:36:10 +02:00 committed by BruebachL
parent d6fbfb32a1
commit 7a3067d4a8
33 changed files with 834 additions and 30 deletions

View file

@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ void FeatureSet::initalizeFeatureList(QMap<QString, bool> &_featureList)
_featureList.insert("idle_client", false);
_featureList.insert("forgot_password", false);
_featureList.insert("websocket", false);
// featureList.insert("hashed_password_login", false);
_featureList.insert("hashed_password_login", false);
_featureList.insert("challenge_response_auth", false);
// These are temp to force users onto a newer client
_featureList.insert("2.7.0_min_version", false);
_featureList.insert("2.8.0_min_version", false);

View file

@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ message Event_ServerIdentification {
enum ServerOptions {
NoOptions = 0;
SupportsPasswordHash = 1;
SupportsChallengeResponseAuth = 2;
}
optional string server_name = 1;
optional string server_version = 2;

View file

@ -6,4 +6,14 @@ message Response_PasswordSalt {
optional Response_PasswordSalt ext = 1017;
}
optional string password_salt = 1;
// scrypt cost parameters for password_salt. Absent/zero for legacy accounts.
optional int32 n = 2;
optional int32 r = 3;
optional int32 p = 4;
// Server-generated challenge. When present the client must authenticate
// with a challenge-response instead of transmitting the password hash.
optional bytes nonce = 5;
// True when the account still uses the legacy password format and should
// be migrated to the scrypt format after a successful login.
optional bool needs_migration = 6;
}

View file

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ message SessionCommand {
FORGOT_PASSWORD_CHALLENGE = 1023;
REQUEST_PASSWORD_SALT = 1024;
SET_CARD_ART_PARAMS = 1025;
SUBMIT_PASSWORD_VERIFIER = 1026;
REPLAY_LIST = 1100;
REPLAY_DOWNLOAD = 1101;
REPLAY_MODIFY_MATCH = 1102;
@ -223,3 +224,14 @@ message Command_SetCardArtParams {
optional double vertical_offset = 5;
optional double zoom = 6;
}
// Client uploads the new password verifier to migrate a legacy account
// after a successful challenge-response login. Idempotent; only applies
// to accounts still using the legacy password format.
message Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier {
extend SessionCommand {
optional Command_SubmitPasswordVerifier ext = 1026;
}
// Full verifier string to store, e.g. "$scrypt$32768$8$1$<salt>$<verifier>"
required string password_verifier = 1;
}